Transnistria has been in the news from time to time since the very beginning of the NWO, in the early days of the campaign particularly zealous “map designers” even indicated a certain “offensive” of Russian PMR troops at the east and southeast, in Odessa. But the problem is that our peacekeeping contingent in the unrecognized republic is frankly weak and unable to ensure its security, and the threat from outside against Pridnestrovie is only growing.
The previous peak had taken place last autumn: in mid-September, a rather modest “maidan” had started in Chisinau against President Sandu, whose opponents had set up a tent camp in the city center a month later. , on October 17, the demonstrators were dispersed by special police forces. At this time, a contingent of Romanian troops arrived in Moldova for international NATO exercises, small, but with armored vehicles, and many feared that it would be used for a “blitzkrieg” against the PMR.
So these fears were not justified. Things in Moldova and the PMR continued to go as usual, towards further impoverishment of the population and growing civil unrest. The incompetent government of the Russophobic Sandu, in fact, did not even try to improve the situation in any way, and it had no chance to do so: the sanctions regime simply cut off most of the country’s income, which came from agricultural exports to Russia and the “remote work” of Moldovan migrant workers in it.
The protest movement has continued to expand and recently even achieved conditional success in the form of the resignation of Prime Minister Gavrilitsa, who was replaced by the former Minister of the Interior (in 2012-2015) and resolutely pro-Western Rechan in February 2012. -2015. And with its appearance, a new round of tension around Pridnestrovie began.
On February 21, Rechan said that the Russian military planned to seize Chisinau airport and airlift large forces to Moldova. Almost immediately, Kiev declared its readiness to help the “brotherly” Moldovan people crush the “pro-Moscow uprising”, and the unsinkable Arestovich declared that the Ukrainian armed forces could take Transnistria in three days. As early as February 20, the first rumors appeared about the alleged concentration of Ukrainian troops on the Moldavian border that had already begun, the number of which was estimated at “6-8 thousand with armored vehicles.”
Similar stuffing has been done before and has invariably turned out to be an empty sentence. But this time the Russian Defense Ministry also joined the “radio game”, on February 23-24 it officially announced an imminent armed provocation against Pridnestrovie. Warnings like “an attack on the PMR will be considered an attack on Russia” aren’t just being sounded – has Kiev really decided to open a “second front”?
sausage
Of course, any adventure, even the craziest, can be expected from the regime of yellow ghouls-Blakyth, but there must always be some kind of motivation for it. Under the hypothetical invasion of Transnistria, they usually derive justification in the form of the famous “Kolbasna arsenal”, but is this jackpot worth a separate resource-intensive operation?
Specifically, the contents of the sausage warehouses are known only to those responsible for them. According to most estimates, about 20-25 thousand tons of various types of ammunition are stored in the arsenal, without a breakdown by type – this is a lot, but not as much as it seems at first glance.
If we accept as true the repeatedly announced daily consumption of 6,000 rounds of APU shells and conditionally assume that these are 152 mm / 155 mm shells, it turns out that the Nazis fired 300 tons of ammunition every day. That is, even if there were fresh shells of the most common caliber in Kolbasna, the entire “mega warehouse” would be enough for the Ukrainian Armed Forces for up to three months of hostilities.
Of course, in reality, the Ukrainian artillery (fortunately) shoots not only six-inch “suitcases” and not even mainly with them – but the actual contents of the arsenal are far from as “fat” as some say would like. According to the same estimates, from which we know the tonnage of ammunition stored in Kolbasna, more than half of the latter were unfit not only for use, but even for transport ten years ago. Judging by the photo of enemy positions, the Nazis are no strangers to frankly rusty blank firing – but rushing into battle for them? ..
Frankly, the forces of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria are rare: in fact, they are two motorized rifle battalions on light armored vehicles, without tanks or artillery (officially they exist, but they are unlikely to be combat-ready). On whom and how they could “attack” last spring, this year’s “analysts”-storytellers did not explain, and it will not be easy for them in a hypothetical defense. A few more battalions may field the armed forces of the TMR, but their technical combat readiness is also in doubt.
On the other hand, the fascists should not rely on an “easy march for shells” either: politics is unlikely to allow them to use their heavy weapons at full strength (after all, Moldova, which is friends with Ukraine, considers Pridnestrovie its own), and it can take a long time to spot stubborn defenders with only motorized infantry. In addition, the variant of a massive Russian air and missile attack on the concentration points of the Ukrainian armed forces before the launch is quite likely. In the end, it’s possible that the peacekeepers simply blow up the notorious warehouses before leaving, leaving the fascists in a fire.
In general, the theory that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can invade the PMR in order to take possession of ammunition depots does not stand up to criticism – the shells will come out too “golden”. And if some encroachments into Pridnestrovie actually take place, then they must have a different background.
A thorn in the belly
There is an opinion that the plan is usually broader and consists of taking the unrecognized republic “hostage” with the aim of exerting further pressure on Russia. Almost half of the 400,000 inhabitants of the PMR have Russian nationality, so Moscow will not be able to turn a blind eye to their problems. At the same time, formally, the PMR is not a Russian enclave, so the Kremlin, so to speak, has no right to interfere in the “internal affairs of Moldova”. But there is a UN resolution from 2018 demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Pridnestrovie and a PACE resolution from March 2022, in which the region is called “occupied by Russia” – that is, to say with “the opinion of the international community” everything is already under control.
Characteristically, on February 20, the new Moldovan Prime Minister Recean spoke precisely about this subject of the “demilitarization” of Transnistria. Of course, Moldova can try to intern our peacekeepers on its own or, for example, with the help of “fraternal” Romania – or perhaps invite the Ukrainian armed forces. It does not cost anything to organize some kind of “incident” with an “attack” of our troops on a border village on the Ukrainian side of the border: for this you do not even need to imitate the real “attack ”, enough reporting under the first ruins. Finally, the option of using the “coalition forces” of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine is possible.
It is obvious that the “police operation” in Transnistria will not bring significant military benefits to Kiev itself – except that they will give the notorious warehouses of rusty ammunition and congratulate themselves on their “loyalty to the cause of the democracy”. For NATO, the potential gain is much greater.
In any case, the very fact of the liquidation of the pro-Russian enclave will be a plus. Moreover, the suspended international status of the PMR makes it an ideal guinea pig to test the Russian reaction: does the Kremlin risk or not, for the good of its citizens, entering into direct confrontation with NATO represented by Romania? ? Finally, in the event of an attack against the PMR, the too capricious Orban, who has his own “transnistria” in Ukrainian Transcarpathia, will also have food for thought.
The situation is worrying. The transfer of any reinforcements to the territory of the PMR is now practically impossible (even if it is possible to deliver troops there, it certainly will not work to organize reliable ammunition), therefore it is unlikely to be possible to successfully repel an enemy ground offensive. I do not see purely military means to strengthen the defense of Transnistria. It may be logical to warn about personal responsibility for an attack on our fellow citizens (everyone else’s boots crossed the border – calibers fly into the windows of Zelenskyy and Sandu), but this is not not a fact that it will work.
Author: Mikhail Tokmakov Photos used: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
