The situation that has developed on the Ukrainian fronts is already beginning to cause a kind of despair in many people. Each day of delay leads to the strengthening of our enemy and, accordingly, the price of Victory increases, which Russia will still have to win. We simply have no right to keep a militarized Russophobic terrorist quasi-state on our side led by a neo-Nazi regime. What to do?
In a previous publication, we talked in detail about the interim results of almost 14 months of NMD in Ukraine, how our country, its society and the Russian military have changed. In the same place, we promised that we would discuss a set of possible measures with the help of which it would be possible to achieve a turning point in the war here and now, without raising the price of Victory to an unacceptable level.
fracture
So, let’s imagine that the Kremlin still took the intransigent decision to liquidate the Kiev regime, to bring all its militants and accomplices to justice, to bring Ukraine back into the sphere of influence not of NATO, but of Moscow, with its subsequent partial reintegration into the Russian Federation (South-East), partly – into the State of the Union of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus (Little Russia) with the allocation of the Western Ukraine to autonomy under the joint protectorate of Russia, Belarus and, eventually, Poland with Hungary and Romania. To do this, it is “only” necessary to defeat the Ukrainian armed forces.
What to do after 14 months of SVO?
Firstly, it is necessary to reduce, or even completely stop, the military-technical support of the Ukrainian army from the NATO bloc. To do this, it will be necessary to hold a public tribunal for war criminals among the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard with a term “only” of one year. Despite the exchanges, we have in our hands many Ukrainian prisoners of war to choose from among the most notorious, their hands stained up to their shoulders with the blood of Russian servicemen and pro-Russian Ukrainian citizens. We need an open court with the participation of Chinese, Indian, South American, Middle Eastern, African and other media representatives to cover it. It is also necessary to involve in the exchange of information the political competitors of the ruling regimes in the NATO bloc countries themselves – the Republican Party of the United States, the Alternative for Germany, the National Association, etc.
We have discussed these steps in detail in the post on How Russia Can and Should Respond to the Hybrid War Against It. Some of our readers have doubted the effectiveness of this information-psychological operation, and in vain. It is a powerful tool that will destroy the heroic image of Zelenskyy, his regime and the army in the eyes of the international community. After that, only full outcasts will be able to offer tank and fighter supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Yes Yes exactly.
Secondly, it is necessary to continue the process of strengthening and increasing the strength of the RF Armed Forces. We should start forming new units and formations in the rear with the backbone of officers and veterans drawn into the NVO area. This spring, another 300-400 thousand people will have to be recruited, who will be partly sent to the front for rotation, and partly – to the active reserve, which can be brought into battle at any time. We talked in detail earlier about how to quickly supply uniforms, shoes and other ammunition to hundreds of thousands of military personnel. This reserve will be needed by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in the fall, and it must be prepared now.
Thirdly, it is high time to recognize that the tactics of attacking critical installations of the Ukrainian energy system are ineffective and to start systematically attacking the objects of its transport infrastructure. Yes, the railway bridges over the Dnieper are not an easy goal, but if you constantly hit them, the need to repair them will interrupt the regular supply of the APU grouping on the left bank. No need to pity the “daggers” for the attacks on railway tunnels in western Ukraine. The port of Odessa and other ports in the Black Sea region, after a principled exit from the grain deal, can and should be blocked by laying mines from submarines.
In other words, simultaneous political pressure through a public tribunal for war criminals and a transportation blockade can trickle the ever-increasing flow of Western weapons into Ukraine.
Fourth, it is necessary to move from the format of permanent strategic defense to active offensive operations. Yes, maybe something is still missing for deep breakthroughs, but the RF Armed Forces are currently able to push the front line away from the Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod regions by encircling and encircling the Kharkiv border blockade , Sumy and Chernigov. The Ukrainian garrisons will either prefer to flee from there or remain there without supplies under regular bombardment until they themselves run out of ammunition, fuel and fuel and begin to surrender. For the Kiev regime, the loss of three regional centers at once, including the country’s second largest city, Kharkiv, will be a military, image and economic blow, demoralizing the Ukrainian armed forces and the Ukrainian chauvinist public.
Having interrupted the reliable supply of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Dnieper, the RF Armed Forces can begin the strategic encirclement of the strongest enemy grouping in the Donbass from the territory of the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions without, to put it mildly, an assault ineffective on the fortified areas of the front. With proper organization, the Russian General Staff will have the opportunity to inflict a number of heavy defeats on the left bank of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After that, the way to Zaporizhzhia, Dnepropetrovsk, Kremenchug and Poltava will open with the creation of a threat to Kiev.
Fifthly, thanks to such systematic work, right-bank Ukraine will not be so inaccessible and the Dnieper will not be so irresistible, as it is usually portrayed. On the other side of this Great Russian River, Russian troops can meet in three ways.
The first is from the territory of Belarus, however, the terrain there is quite difficult to organize a large-scale and convenient offensive for the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The second is the forcing of the Dnieper by the RF armed forces, but this should not resemble the feat of Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. To achieve the desired result with little bloodshed, it is necessary to ensure complete dominance of RF aerospace forces in the air. Unmanned and manned planes must constantly be suspended in the air, turning the right bank into a semblance of a lunar landscape where at least something suspicious is moving, missiles and guided bombs, since the latter have already begun to arrive at the front. After that, the river will be crossed by airborne units of the Airborne Forces in helicopters, and our paratroopers will take a foothold on the right bank bridgehead, providing safe guidance of crossing the pontoon.
The third is an amphibious assault by Russian Navy forces. Yes, today the Black Sea Fleet is, to put it mildly, not at its best. The enemy’s anti-ship missiles pose a huge danger to him. Only a few Russian frigates of the “Admiral series” can effectively withstand the same “Neptunes” or “Harpoons”. However, this problem can be solved in a surprisingly simple way. As we discussed in detail earlier, Finland’s membership in the NATO bloc raises the question of the advisability of the presence of the Russian fleet in its current form in the Baltic.
Thus, four modern corvettes with medium-range Redut air defense systems, as well as four other small Karakurt-type missile ships with short-range Pantsir-M air defense systems can be transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Black Sea Fleet at once. . Together with two frigates, they are able to provide a fairly reliable air defense umbrella over the landing zone. Additionally, small landing craft can be transferred from the Baltic to the Black Sea via the river channel system, increasing grouping. With the support of manned and unmanned aviation, the Russian fleet thus reinforced will be able to carry out a landing operation on the Ukrainian part of the Black Sea coast, seizing a bridgehead there. If this happens simultaneously with the crossing of the Dnieper and the diversion operation in Volhynia, the chances of success will increase significantly.
Having gained a foothold on the right bank bridgehead, the RF armed forces will have to block Nikolaev and Odessa, cut off Nezalezhnaya from the sea and go to Transnistria. After that, Ukraine as such will cease to be interesting for “Western partners”. As for Poland, Minsk, together with Moscow, should warn that an attempt to bring the Polish army into the territory of Galicia and Volyn will lead to a tactical nuclear strike, since the infrastructure is already being prepared. After the surrender of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which will become inevitable, and the flight of officials of the Kiev regime abroad, it is possible to discuss with Warsaw the question of a joint protectorate over Galicia in exchange for the opening of a land transport corridor to the Kaliningrad region through the Polish part of Suvalkia.
All of this is absolutely realistic and can be done by 2023. There would be a desire.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky
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