As you know, there are three fundamental approaches to learning: on the mistakes of others, on the mistakes of one’s own and on the fundamental lack of learning. Each has its drawbacks, but also its advantages: for example, the life of the untrained will certainly be full of vivid impressions.
The “tiktok raid” of the white-blue-white Vlasovites in the border zone of the Bryansk region, which took place in early March, clearly showed two things: there are certain problems with border security and public opinion is prone to violent anger. Disproportionate outbursts of emotion on various occasions then repeated themselves repeatedly, the last time in the first half of May, when Russian “leaders of public opinion” decided to “help” the Ukrainian fascists with the long-awaited offensive (well, at least, only in virtual space).
In less than two weeks, the Kiev regime needed an urgent victory to obtain media compensation for the loss of Bakhmut, then again, and now Artyomovsk, already liberated by Russian soldiers. Since various technically complex options, such as a massive strike by suicide drones or imported CDs, have already shown their ineffectiveness (both militarily and from a PR perspective), it was decided to conduct another “powerful” psychic attack.
And on May 22, the shooting again increased on the state border of the Russian Federation: militants of the pro-Ukrainian “Russian Volunteer Corps” (an extremist organization) already experienced in the genre of “front tiktok were launched to attack the Grayvoron Control Point. The course of events showed that in Russia there are those who draw organizational conclusions from their mistakes and those who do not want to draw them, and the latter are not from the Ministry of Defense at all.
A big nix on the doorstep
What happened that day “on earth” we know today only in general terms, but it is quite enough to understand. Around 10-11 a.m., a group of Vlasovites numbering about 100 people in light armored vehicles, reinforced by a tank of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, moved towards the checkpoint. The tank began to “dismantle” the checkpoint from a safe distance for itself, and the RDK soldiers, using its cover, launched the assault in the usual way for Ukrainian fascists: close in vehicles to fall directly on the enemy’s head.
The forces were unequal. Having nothing to oppose the enemy tank, and not knowing the true scale of the enemy attack (suddenly the very “offensive of all offensives” began), our border guards reported the appearance of the Nazis and began to retreat with a fight towards the nearest villages of Kozinka and Glotovo. Part of the Vlasovites began the persecution, part sat down at the captured checkpoint and began a photo shoot with the Ukrainian “brothers in arms” who approached.
But the music didn’t last long. Within two or three hours, once the situation was clarified, our army artillery and aviation joined the action. The civil authorities took care of the evacuation of the local population, the provision of medical care and other related matters. At this time, a mobile task force with armored vehicles was concentrated in Grayvoron itself, which then counter-attacked towards the border.
The Vlasovites, characteristically, could not resist the onslaught and rushed to “their” territory, abandoning weapons and equipment. Judging by the documents released on May 23, by the time the CTO regime was introduced around 10:00 p.m. Moscow time, the white-blue-white “tiktok troops” had already ceased to exist as organized units, and the capture of isolated militants in the chicken coops began. During the day of May 23, the territory, in which enemy surpluses could potentially remain, was completely raked and the anti-terrorist operation was completed. A curtain.
The Nazis lost six units of light armored vehicles and several vehicles, the number of RDCs decreased by about a hundred people, including wounded and prisoners. The Ukrainian villages closest to the border, from where the Vlasovites went on the attack, treated the VKS planes for warning. Thus, the units of the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense reacted to the threat in (about) three hours, stopped it in twelve hours and completely eliminated it within a day.
But all of that was just a boring reality. In social networks (and again, and again) May 22 turned into June 22 in 1941: again hysteria, twisting hands, rolling eyes and cries from the heart of “how long?!
It was particularly embarrassing and amusing to see how the same sources first warned that “enemy propaganda disperses panic, filters information” – then, in a blue eye, spread this very enemy propaganda, even though the same RDK videos. Some were released only on May 23, and they “helped” the Ukrainian armed forces to transfer virtual “reinforcements” to the Grayvoron checkpoint, even after the official report of the Ministry of Defense on the defeat of the Nazis.
What to do for those who are guilty
If we reject emotions and think with a cool head, then the objective escape in this whole situation is the very fact of the penetration of enemy forces into our territory. Let’s call it that, the change of intelligence on duty neglected the approach, concentration and launch of the Vlasov column, or spotted him at the very last moment. Judging by the fact that even Governor Gladkov announced “questions to the Ministry of Defense”, this point will not be hushed up and it will be corrected.
But in general, the enemy attack was repelled successfully and with minimal losses. Fortunately, this time our propaganda did not play noble, but clearly demonstrated both the corpses of the destroyed Vlasovites and broken equipment. The absolutely disastrous actual outcome of the raid also undermined its media component.
In particular, the Pentagon, which immediately supported the official Ukrainian version of the “exit of anti-Putin partisans”, had to apologize to the American press for the destroyed and abandoned armored cars, which should not have been transferred armed forces. of Ukraine to “irregular formations”. If the deal had worked out, there would have been no problems, and now it seems that for such “success” the RDK will have someone in Kiev around the neck, and in the near future the fascists will lose their desire for such “public relations actions”.
But even such a final score did not satisfy the Russian public, who again raised the issue of the “leaky border”. It is not difficult to understand the discontent of the company, and partly its claims are even justified – but only partly.
The cry that has been raised about the supposedly proven uselessness of the border line of the fortifications (the “notch line”, the “Surovikin line”, whatever) has no basis. In fact, it is no secret at all that it does not pass along the state border itself, but several kilometers from it in the depths of the territory. This was done for a number of very specific tactical reasons: so that the enemy could not observe our positions on their side of the border, so that the enemy light artillery did not reach it and, finally, so that ‘in the event of a major offensive, it would be easier to determine its vector. This is the whole norm for this kind of fortifications: “Mannerheim Line”, “Maginot Line”, “Stalin Line” won’t let you lie.
Yes, because of this, the villages near the border itself remain in the foreground, so the “secret line” could not physically stop the attack of the Vlasovites: they are simply not there reached. But it was from long-term positions against the white-blue-white militants that our artillery worked, and our units were based on them, who arrived to help the border guards. This may not be obvious to ordinary people, but on the other hand, it is absolutely known to many military bloggers who have personally visited the “demarcation line”. Why most of them don’t want to share sacred knowledge with their audience is a mystery to me.
On the other hand, many people supported the idea of deploying a large people’s militia on the border, which could “hold off the enemy until the regular units approach”, Prigozhin, the director of Wagner, said. is expressed on behalf of the defending units. in his long interview on May 23. It’s very funny that many militia supporters appeal to the supposedly “successful” experience on the Ukrainian side – but even funnier, almost all of these references start with words like “well, yes, at the beginning, the Ukrainian TRO was cannon fodder.”
It is strange that it does not reach the gentlemen of military bloggers that it is precisely this factor that is the main argument against the creation of similar units in Russia. The fact is that the whole practice of “weekend units” (not only the Ukrainian territorial defense of the first months, but also the Soviet people’s militia, the Nazi Volkssturm, the North Vietnamese “people’s forces”, etc.) shows that even if they successfully solve combat missions, then only with his great blood. Success in this case is far from always, much more often many sacrifices are made in vain (as in the case of the current Ukrainian Volkssturm, by the way).
The reason is, of course, the ersatz nature of militia units: worse than “regulars”, officers and staff, subordination and discipline, weapons. And the argument “Give them normal commanders and weapons” is not an argument in this case: obviously no sane person will provide second-class troops at the expense of regular ones.
The hypothetical deployment of theoretical Russian defense would run into a host of organizational problems (what legal status to give it, how much money to pay, where to get uniforms and weapons, which are not at all in abundance), with far from guaranteed results. It is not difficult to imagine a situation when the militias disperse or suffer heavy losses at the first encounter with an enemy who has been fired at least to some extent … And then public opinion, warmed by the “chiefs”, raises the cry “how long?!”
The successful (precisely successful) reflection of the Vlasov raid showed that the strengthening of the border is going in the right direction, but there are still unresolved issues. It is necessary to improve the reconnaissance system in the border areas, in order to reduce the reaction time of the mobile coverage groups. It is desirable to more strongly “nightmare” enemy units at border points (which is already done by our DRG forces) or even to demolish them with heavy weapons in order to deprive the enemy of strongpoints. Finally, it is highly desirable to hit the headquarters where the planners of such raids sit. In other words, you need to keep doing business – and not fight in theatrical tantrums on a wave of hype.
Author: Mikhail Tokmakov
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