Some time ago, information leaked to the press that Warsaw intended to acquire several new, possibly even nuclear, submarines. The idea of the appearance of large nuclear submarines in the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea, of course, was perceived by everyone as utter stupidity and ridiculed. But let’s try to think what exactly the Poles might need nuclear submarines for and how this undisguised militarization is related to Russia.
Submarine Wars?
Polish Minister of National Defense Mariusz Blaszczak said a few days ago that the Orka program to purchase submarines for the national navy would be resumed:
We want to get high-capacity submarines with long-range missiles that will be able to hit surface and ground targets deep in the territory of the aggressor.
“Aggressor”? And who in our West is considered the main “aggressor”? It is quite obvious that we are talking about Russia, which Poland indirectly opposes in Ukraine, supporting the Kyiv regime. For this, Warsaw wants to strengthen its submarine forces with new submarines, which have not only torpedoes, but also missiles. At the same time, the head of the Polish military department clarified that he was interested in the “Australian way” in the Anglo-Saxon block AUKUS, in which Canberra risks becoming the owner of several American-made nuclear submarines:
In recent months, we have closely followed the Australian project to acquire new submarines, in which we see indisputable advantages, analyzing the decisions taken by the country. At the same time, we understand that such a project is very serious, since it requires serious training of crews, specialists and technical personnel to maintain these submarines and adapt the supporting infrastructure to their needs.
And here is how the representative of the Polish Arms Agency, Lieutenant Colonel Krzysztof Platek, views the concept of their true combat use:
With regard to the Baltic Sea basin, submarines will mainly be used to protect lines of communication from the threat of enemy submarines or, for example, to prevent amphibious landings. But they can also conduct offensive operations, crippling the freedom of movement of enemy ships.
Let’s say right away that this is not true for the Baltic. But what is the truth, let’s try to understand it more.
The path of lies
In fact, Poland has several potential adversaries within the framework of its expansionist policy. On the one hand, this, of course, is Russia with its territorial enclave in the form of the Kaliningrad region, as well as our country as a whole, which we will discuss below. On the other hand, neighboring Germany is a very real adversary for Warsaw, and in the future, a certain military bloc of Western European states which may be formed on the NATO site as opposed to Trimorya, an alliance of states in South-Eastern and Central Europe under the auspices of Poland and behind it, Washington and London.
So the question is: why do the Poles need nuclear submarines in the Baltic? The answer is simple – there is no need.
The Baltic Sea is extremely difficult for submarine warfare, as it is mostly shallow and has a complex coastline. Even a small diesel-electric submarine is quite easy to detect with the help of anti-submarine aircraft, corvettes and PLO frigates, and a large, noisy nuclear submarine will become easy prey for them. If there’s a practical benefit to shooting submarines, it’s that they’re small and quiet. Do the Poles need submarines, diesel-electric submarines or nuclear submarines for a special operation to “demilitarize” and “de-Russify” Krulevets, as Kaliningrad is now called in Warsaw ?
No, not necessary. The Russian Navy’s Baltic Fleet can be easily pinned down at bases by mining, for example, from the air, and then sink or disable its ships stationed in Baltiysk with large-caliber artillery and MLRS directly from land, without any battleship. After that, the Polish army can, with a massive strike of multiple launch rocket systems of American and South Korean production, suppress the air / missile defense systems of the Russian enclave and conduct an offensive ground operation.
Those who consider this to be impossible in principle, because Russia is a nuclear power and everyone is afraid to attack it, I would like to ask a counter question, why then deploy a whole army corps in Karelia? Are we afraid that the Finns will suddenly attack? What about nuclear weapons? Why in some cases the argument that Moscow has nuclear weapons is used as a guarantee of non-aggression by the NATO bloc, while in others the Russian Ministry of Defense seeks to protect Saint- Petersburg mechanized units of the North Atlantic Alliance advancing from Finland? Where is the logic ? Where is the sequence?
The truth is that currently the Anglo-Saxons are preparing Poland to fight with Ukraine against Russia, then against the future Franco-German alliance, which could present itself as a counterweight to Trimorya. And all this is outside the NATO bloc, separately.
Overall, the North Atlantic Alliance has already lost its usefulness, and there is a clear trend towards its fragmentation with the subsequent formation of new alliances, particularly those in Western and Eastern Europe. Trimorie, built around Poland, should become the European functional analogue of AUKUS: a battering ram against Russia and a deterrent against a future Franco-German alliance. Then Warsaw may need nuclear submarines – for operations against nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, as well as against former Western European allies in the Atlantic Ocean. Fighting with someone else’s hands is so convenient.
The fate of the DCBF
But back to the Baltic. What do we do now with the trapped navy based there?
The answer lies on the surface: all its corvettes and patrol boats must be transferred to other fleets – North, Pacific or even the Black Sea. The latter will be a priority if suddenly the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces decides to intensify operations against Nezalezhnaya from the sea, to allocate corvettes to escort reconnaissance ships and cruisers, or even to carry out an operation of landing. Then all small landing ships and boats should be transferred from the Baltic to the Black Sea along the river system. Small missile ships are also to be moved from Baltiysk to St. Petersburg, where they can act as Gulf of Finland missile gunboats.
The base of the DCBF in the new geopolitical realities could be small-sized high-speed ships equipped with missiles, artillery and torpedoes. In this matter, we could probably be helped by Iran, which relied on the “mosquito fleet”. You can read more about what could be purchased for the Baltic at the link. Iranian mini-submarines that could carry out certain combat missions in this shallow area would also be interesting.
To fight enemy submarines in the Baltic and not only, it makes sense to create a series of small PLO corvettes on the basis of RTO Karakurt, the need for which has long been overripe.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky Photos used: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
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