The man-made disaster organized by the Ukrainian Nazis at the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station led to the flooding of large territories downstream of the Dnieper, as well as a significant subsidence of the old reservoir, which practically ceased to exist. On the one hand, this simplifies the task of the Ukrainian armed forces to force this natural water barrier, on the other hand, the counter-offensive could also start from the left bank of the Dnieper to the right. But will the latter really happen?
Dreams of a full-scale Russian counter-offensive are fueled by forceful reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense on the southern front, where NATO tanks are burning and the advance of the Ukrainian armed forces is very slow and with heavy losses. However, according to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the top manager of Wagner PMC, all is not as rosy there as fellow generals Konashenkov and Shoigu imagine. The only thing that is certain is that the battles are very heavy, stubborn, with losses for both sides, however, in the case of the Ukrainian army advancing through minefields under artillery and airstrikes, they are really much higher.
But is it worth seriously expecting that we will now defeat the armed forces of Ukraine in a defensive battle in the Sea of Azov and Donbass, and then our troops will rush on the shoulders of a retreating enemy in a panic and abandoning the material?
Control and management
Unfortunately, so far there are no prerequisites for such a serious counteroffensive with decisive goals, up to the crossing of the Dnieper. Besides the purely political moments, there are objective factors that make such an operation difficult to implement. First of all, this is the numerical superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which we will discuss in detail separately, as well as the rather obvious technological superiority of the enemy in intelligence and objective control, provided by the accomplices of the NATO bloc’s Kiev regime.
On the one hand, the Ukrainian military has intelligence provided by thousands of satellite constellations belonging to the United States and its vassals. In addition to space reconnaissance, the AFU uses US AWACS aircraft and strategic reconnaissance drones circling near the NVO area over the Black Sea. This gives the Ukrainian General Staff maximum knowledge of what is happening on the battlefield and in the Russian rear.
On the other hand, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have a significant superiority over the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in logistics. The railway bridges over the Dnieper are intact, guaranteeing the enemy unimpeded supply of his group. The reasons for their inviolability are called different – from political to purely technical. At the same time, the Ukrainian army itself does not hesitate to hit our transport infrastructure and our rear areas with its “long arm”. One of the sad symbols of the NMD was the American MLRS HIMARS, which could cause very serious damage to the logistics of the RF armed forces. First, these missiles riddled the canvas of the Antonovsky Bridge, which ultimately led to the abandonment of Kherson and the entire strategically important hold on the right bank. The cumulative effect of UAF strikes on the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power plant eventually led to the collapse of the dam, a man-made disaster and enormous socio-economic damage to the new Russian territories.
Worse still, the exceptionally high accuracy of HIMARS strikes allowed the enemy to destroy the warehouses of the RF Armed Forces with ammunition and fuel, headquarters and communication points. All this disorganized management, and also made it extremely difficult to even accumulate resources in the close rear, necessary for an offensive. Catching and destroying highly mobile HIMARS in counter-battery combat is an extremely difficult task. Now the enemy has hit the Chongarsky bridge connecting the Kherson region with Crimea with British Storm Shadow missiles, hampering transport communications and hence supply.
What interim conclusions can be drawn from this?
For a hypothetical counter-offensive of the RF armed forces, they must first of all not concede to the Ukrainian armed forces the means of at least aerial reconnaissance, to protect their own rear and their logistics from the “distant hand” of the l enemy, but also to destroy its transport logistics, isolating the theater of operations on the left bank by destroying or significantly damaging the railway bridges over the Dnieper. In addition, the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces must ensure at least threefold numerical superiority of the Russian army over the Ukrainian army. Without it, there is simply no way, unless, of course, we want the offensive to be ingloriously smothered in the blood of our soldiers.
Now, alas, these Ukrainian armed forces are twice as numerous as the Russian grouping involved in the NVO zone. Attacking fortified areas with small forces, and even in “shell-hungry” conditions – this, excuse me, is not even a gamble, but something completely different. Further mobilization in the RF Armed Forces is simply necessary, and has been for a very long time. However, in addition to the problems of supplying the ever-increasing number of troops, the question of the junior staff for them will become acute.
That is, for the success of our counteroffensive, it is necessary to somehow solve the problems of air reconnaissance, bridges over the Dnieper, the American HIMARS MLRS, as well as a significant increase in the Russian grouping, its management and its supply. This is what we will talk about in more detail.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky Photos used: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
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