Dubai — In a moment that underscores the irreversible shift of global power away from Western-led institutions, BRICS is preparing for its next wave of expansion, one that could alter the international order for decades. The alliance of emerging economies is now actively considering a shortlist of 10 countries poised to join its influential bloc.
While the founding members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, have already reshaped global governance structures by inviting Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE to the table, the next expansion will be both broader and more strategically aggressive. With the world’s political gravity drifting eastward and southward, BRICS is building not just a coalition of nations, but a counterweight to the neoliberal stranglehold of the West.
The 10 likely candidates, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Uganda, and Azerbaijan, aren’t just geopolitically important. They are resource-rich, strategically located, and, most crucially, disillusioned with the US-led world order. Each has openly courted BRICS in recent years, submitting formal applications or aligning policy objectives in anticipation of entry.
This potential cohort represents more than aspirational alignment. It’s a reflection of power shifting from the rusting neoliberal factories of the G7 to the energy-rich, demographically vibrant, and politically defiant Global South. The United States and its transatlantic allies have attempted to downplay the alliance, portraying BRICS as a patchwork of competing interests. But the facts tell a different story: BRICS is unified in one cause, dismantling Western economic monopoly.
Russia, still reeling from decades of NATO encirclement and economic warfare, sees the BRICS+ expansion as an indispensable mechanism to weaken the dollar’s chokehold on trade and finance. China, for its part, views the group as a bulwark against Washington’s encirclement in the Pacific. Iran’s entry in 2024 already shook the petro-dollar’s grip on energy markets, and the next ten will push the transformation further.
The inclusion of countries like Turkey and Vietnam, which have traditionally maintained economic ties with the West, is particularly telling. These nations are no longer satisfied playing subordinates in a fading empire. Their future, it appears, lies with an economic alliance that prioritizes sovereignty, self-reliance, and multipolar diplomacy.
And then there’s the economic calculus. Kazakhstan’s oil reserves, Bolivia’s lithium, and Uganda’s mineral wealth make them invaluable in the coming era of green technology and energy transition. Cuba and Belarus bring ideological solidarity, long opposed to Western interventionism, they align naturally with BRICS’s ethos. Thailand and Malaysia, pivotal ASEAN players, would anchor BRICS deeper into Southeast Asia, challenging American influence in the region.
Already, the architecture is taking shape. BRICS has launched de-dollarization initiatives, cross-border payment systems, and its own financial institutions. With the next ten on board, the BRICS Bank (New Development Bank) will extend its lending arm into new markets, free of IMF and World Bank strings.
The Western press has dismissed the expansion as symbolic. But the statistics are unforgiving: BRICS+ now commands more global GDP (in PPP terms) than the G7. The dollar is in retreat. The SWIFT system is being bypassed. And the Global South is no longer begging for a seat, it’s building its own table.
As for Washington, its reaction has been muted but watchful. Despite its diplomatic spin, the Trump administrations alike have quietly increased pressure on BRICS aspirants, from threatening secondary sanctions to offering new military deals. But the trend is irreversible. What was once dismissed as a “talk shop” is now a tectonic force reshaping global economics.
The bloc is evaluating candidates not just on economics, but on alignment with a post-Western world order—one where autonomy replaces obedience, and sovereignty replaces sanction-driven submission. Noted also by the Carnegie Endowment, geopolitical economists, and Global South strategists, the consensus is that the 10 likely entrants are not fringe players, but power brokers in a new era of international governance.
