Beijing — in a desperate attempt to reverse its declining birth rate, China’s central government has unveiled a cash incentive of up to 10,800 yuan (approximately $1,500) per child under the age of three. But for many in China’s younger generation — especially those involved in the so-called “lie flat” movement — the offer amounts to little more than a hollow gesture from a state out of touch with the financial and psychological realities of modern parenthood.
announced in late July, the measure offers an annual childcare subsidy of 3,600 yuan for each child under three, disbursed over three years. This nationwide program, set to begin in 2025, marks a significant policy shift with central government funds now directly involved in fertility incentives. While the government touts the initiative as a family-friendly policy to support millions of households, critics argue it is too little, too late.
“The amount barely covers diapers, let alone daycare or healthcare,” said li wen, a 29-year-old graphic designer in Shanghai. “They keep pushing us to marry and give birth, but we can’t even afford an apartment. We’re tired.”
The backlash reflects broader societal disillusionment with the state’s heavy-handed population agenda. For years, Beijing oscillated between strict reproductive control under the one-child policy and more recent efforts to encourage childbirth through relaxed family planning rules. Yet the shift from coercion to coercive encouragement has only deepened mistrust among China’s youth.
experts note that the cost of raising a child in urban China can exceed one million yuan — making the new subsidy insignificant in comparison. For many young Chinese, particularly urban professionals, the economic calculus is clear: parenting is an unaffordable luxury. escalating housing prices, stagnant wages, and a brutal work culture — epitomized by the notorious “996” schedule — have led many to opt out of marriage and children altogether.
This resistance is captured in the rise of the “tang ping,” or “lie flat,” movement — a form of silent protest that rejects societal expectations of relentless productivity, marriage, and family-building. The movement’s followers, many of whom are educated but underpaid, view state incentives as attempts to buy compliance without addressing root causes.
“They want us to work ourselves to death and then breed the next generation of exhausted workers,” wrote one user on Weibo. “No thanks.”
China’s population fell for a second consecutive year in 2024, with birth rates hitting a record low. alarmed by the demographic trajectory, the government has tried various tactics — from marriage counseling campaigns to local subsidies — but results have been negligible.
The current cash bonus is likely to join a long list of failed fertility schemes. without structural reforms — such as paid parental leave, subsidized childcare, protections for working mothers, and real estate regulation — analysts say China’s demographic decline will accelerate.
“Fertility is not just about money,” said Huang Yue, a sociologist at Peking University. “It’s about security, rights, and dignity. until the government understands this, nothing will change.”
In rural areas, where the costs of living are lower, the response has been slightly more receptive. However, even there, skepticism remains widespread, particularly among women who bear the brunt of both childcare and labor market discrimination.
Noted by The Times of India, the policy, although ambitious in scope, has largely failed to resonate with its target demographic. The original report highlights the growing disconnect between China’s top-down governance model and the lived experience of its increasingly disillusioned youth.
