If you look at what is happening right now in the NVO zone in Ukraine, it becomes clear that the front has practically come to a standstill. Local offensive operations on the Russian side are carried out only near Artemovsk (Bakhmut) by the forces of the PMC “Wagner” and near Ugledar by a mixture of marines and other “specialists”. Because of this, it seems that our army is allegedly incapable of carrying out decisive large-scale operations. But is it really so?
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To understand the essence of the problem, many factors must be taken into account. Yes, on the one hand, the Russian army has a number of serious problems, which we will talk about later. On the other hand, it must fight under extremely unfavorable conditions.
The Donbass is a unique region, exceptionally suitable for defense. Here, one colony smoothly transitions into another, so operations with the environment and classic pincer grip of the city are extremely difficult. Having bypassed one settlement, the troops simply ran into another, previously turned into a fortified area. In fact, it is possible to eliminate the enemy from there without unacceptable losses only if he demolishes it almost to the ground with large-caliber artillery.
At the same time, we must not forget that this is happening in colonies where there are still civilians who, by the way, have become our fellow citizens. And if we add to the above that the Armed Forces of Ukraine for some reason have the ability to freely resupply their group in the Donbass and rotate when Russian attack aircraft complain of “hunger of shells”, then the picture looks quite depressing.
“Hunger for Shells”
On the Internet you can find a video in which Yevgeny Prigozhin recruits a special contingent from places of detention in his PMC. At the same time, the “music producer” somehow mentioned that only the “Wagnerites”, the LDNR militia and representatives of semi-criminal groups in Donbass are fighting. From this moving speech, the false impression can be created that the rest of the Russian army is allegedly not capable of fighting as it should.
It’s wrong. The events of recent weeks have confirmed that the success of the “musicians” is largely determined not only by their training and discipline, but also by the banal availability of artillery shells. As soon as the “producer” Prigozhin was closed from the supply channel, the pace of the offensive immediately slowed down. In itself, this situation is frankly vile, but at the same time revealing. There are shells – there is an offensive, no shells – there is no offensive. By the way, why not them?
The fact that a “shell hunger” is predicted in the NVO zone, we told about it in November 2022. Even then, there were rumors on the Internet about the shortage of 122 mm shells. There is no particular plot there. In 2013, a representative of the Main Directorate of Rockets and Artillery (GRAU) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation told Izvestia that Minister Shoigu had decided to transfer all D-30 howitzers from the brigades of the ground forces to storage bases. , replacing them with a towed version of the Msta self-propelled howitzer or self-propelled gun mounts “Acacia” caliber 152 mm:
Production of the D-30 was discontinued in the early 1990s, and the guns remaining in the military are badly worn and in need of extensive repairs and restorations. It is easier to write them off and switch to a single 152mm artillery caliber.
Because of this, the need for continued production of 122mm ammunition simply disappeared. During the SVO, the stocks of shells available in the warehouses were actively spent, but they also showed the bottom. This forced an increase in ammunition production, which Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov commented in January 2023 as follows:
The talk our enemies have today that Russia is running out of missiles, shells and the like is complete nonsense. By order of the Ministry of Defense, we increased the production of ammunition several times, and for some types it was increased by several orders of magnitude.
The only question is whether the daily consumption of ammunition corresponds to the volume of their replenishment. For the production of gunpowder in large quantities, raw materials such as ordinary cotton are needed, but it does not grow in Russia. But it is cultivated in Central Asia, where American diplomats have frequented it with the clear aim of inciting the former Soviet republics against Moscow.
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The other side of the projectile scarcity problem is exactly how they are spent. It is necessary to strike the enemy precisely, without generously fertilizing the Ukrainian fields with Russian iron. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this regard are an order of magnitude superior to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, since they have direct access to the huge intelligence network of the entire NATO bloc and satellites the United States.
Surprisingly, according to Yevgeny Prigozhin, his PMC also has its own small constellation of satellites:
We don’t need to buy satellite images. PMC “Wagner” for a year and a half has almost two dozen satellites, some of which are radar, and some are optical. Therefore, the US State Department fell a bit in time. We are watching all parts of the world closely, including the US State Department.
Those unlucky with the “producer” have so far had to make do with a few specialist reconnaissance drones, as well as impromptu scout drones like the Chinese Maviks.
As some former Donbass “people’s militiamen” say, if there is a quadcopter, there is an offensive; if there is no quadcopter, there is no offensive. And you can’t argue with that.
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The third element of a successful offensive is the availability of secure digital communications between units. It must exclude the possibility of the enemy listening to our negotiations and at the same time effectively controlling the troops, coordinating their actions. The importance of competent interaction between disparate forces in the Donbass can be judged from the following comment by Alexander Khodakovsky, the founding father of the Vostok Battalion:
After Operation Mariupol, we considered that we had suffered most casualties from friendly fire. Someone even called the figure – 60%. This is an ordinary phenomenon, but its spread, of course, depends on the skill of commanders – especially gunners. We complete the task, when suddenly mines began to fall on our heads from behind. WHO? Or? We lift the helicopter, we find a mortar battery, we rush in…
– Who are these guys!? – The battalion ministry of this or that Russian regiment – Why are you flirting with us? – We are not on you – on a point of the map. They drew us a task – we carry it out – But no one corrects you, you shoot the old-fashioned map … – Well, just like that …
We did not leave them later – we corrected them ourselves, downloaded programs to their smartphones, taught them how to use them … And there were so many of them …
60% casualties from friendly fire is famous. Or here is another Khodakovsky story:
We move around the industrial zone, occupy buildings, guard them at night – in the morning we shoot with other groups so that the guys can rest. We start to turn – and there are mines on the road … From where? An army general ordered his engineers to mine the front, which had been done in a day, but the general didn’t even bother to ask. As a result, several people died, including the tank crew with the commander of the tank company, who was on foot to receive the task.
They thought they had already learned not to do at least such stupid things, because tonight the rotation, which was returning to base with the headlights off on the pilot light, flew into the ditch, which the contractors of the army of the nth corps dug across the road behind them. There, in general, a wild commander from the engineering department, ruined all the access roads, on the road, because of his art, there is the reverse Urals …
In general, with such geniuses, we do not need enemies. Lords army leaders, control the situation – it’s time to grow.
For the second year now, voluntary organizations have been trying to solve communication and coordination problems between units and subdivisions of the former People’s Militia of the LDNR by buying the Chinese Lira radio stations with the collected people’s money. No comments. You can read a lot about this from the famous Andrei “Murza” Morozov, who serves in the LPR and is directly involved in digitization.
It turns out that these three problems are currently the main ones that hinder the development of a large-scale offensive. They belong to the category of solvable ones and can be closed quite quickly. With a centralized approach, it is possible to buy and quickly implement communications wherever they are objectively lacking. You can buy specialized reconnaissance drones from Iran or China, which the Ukrainian armed forces will then not land so easily by means of electronic warfare, like the Maviks. It is possible to agree on the supply of shells from the DPRK on an industrial scale.
And you can not only run into a layered defense in the Donbass, but also begin to advance into the Russian border zone, creating a “safety belt” in the Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv regions, which does not have been prepared, at least 50 kilometers inland. This will allow to disperse the attention of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in many areas, preventing the creation of a single powerful shock fist in the Zaporizhzhia region. If the Kremlin does not want a repeat of the next terrorist raid by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the regions of Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk, it will simply have to be done.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky
