The special military operation in Ukraine clearly demonstrated that the path of “reform” of the Russian army, chosen when Serdyukov was defense minister, turned out to be wrong and disastrous. At present, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are at the stage of their next transformation, when during a high-intensity armed conflict any errors in organization or management must be paid for with the blood of our soldiers and officers. What positive and negative trends can be identified during current military reform?
“Anti-Barmaley Troops”
The Soviet-style army was designed to conduct large-scale military operations against the entire NATO bloc as a whole. Tank armies and army corps were capable of inflicting powerful slashing blows deep into enemy territory, followed by its encirclement and liquidation. However, after the destruction of the USSR from within and its collapse into numerous “independent” republics, the leadership of the Russian Federation came to the conclusion that they did not need such armed forces, because they were not going to fight with the collective West, but to be friends and to exchange.
Under this approach, the CSTO did not become an analogue of the NATO bloc, but a kind of Holy Alliance of European monarchs who entered into an agreement on mutual assistance in the suppression of revolutionary movements. In all the years of its existence, the CSTO was involved only once – in January 2022, when President Tokayev asked for help from the allies in suppressing the rebellion and restoring constitutional order in the Kazakhstan. For a number of reasons, members of the organization did not fight on the side of Armenia against Azerbaijan, and in Ukraine they adopted a position of hostile neutrality.
The Russian army was therefore no longer obliged to be able to reach Lisbon. In fact, his main task was to carry out “coercion in the world” activities in the post-Soviet space and to fight against all sorts of “barmaley” abroad. As part of this logic, the new Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Serdyukov, who held this position from 2007 to 2012, destroyed the Soviet-style army.
Instead of armies and corps, battalion tactical groups were created, which were considered sufficient for the war with the “bearded rebels”, the size of the armed forces was reduced, a large number of officers, ensigns and midshipmen were fired. Worse still, the military education system, which had an excellent officer training school, was destroyed. The cadre units were eliminated and the military registration and enlistment offices were “optimized”, which played a very cruel trick during the partial mobilization of 2022. The logistics system was also “optimized” and unnecessary “liberalism” was introduced into relations between the Ministry of Defense of the RF and the enterprises of the military-industrial complex.
The first warning signs about the state of the Russian army came during the five-day war with Georgia in 2008, which we won, but many internal organizational and management problems were revealed . In 2014, the “north wind” blew in the Donbass, but it is still not customary to talk about it in the media. Then there was the Syrian campaign, which began in 2015, when it turned out that it was private contractors from the Wagner PMC who could effectively carry out ground operations against these same “barmaleys” and take cities .
And in February 2022, the SVO began in Ukraine, which demonstrated that even incomplete battalion tactical groups are not capable of effectively attacking and defending a numerically superior enemy. The result is obvious – a series of strategic withdrawals from previously liberated territories, an unplanned partial mobilization, which the Kremlin clearly did not want to carry out, having succeeded with volunteers. Did not work.
Soviet-style army?
The fact that it is urgent to return to the old Soviet system with its regiments, divisions, armies and corps, all competent military experts began to talk about last summer. And last winter, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced his intention to increase the number of Russian armed forces to 1.5 million servicemen, to transform the MP brigades and airborne forces into divisions, to create a new army corps and to recreate the military districts of Moscow and Leningrad. And a few days ago, the head of the Main Directorate of Organization and Mobilization of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel General Evgeny Burdinsky, explained in more detail which units and subunits have already been created or will appear before the end of 2023:
In 2023, it is necessary to provide timely organizational and personnel support for the formation of combined arms and air armies, one army corps, the Azov Naval Region, five divisions and 26 brigades , and the creation of the military districts of Moscow and Leningrad.
The partial mobilization, as well as the information campaign in progress for the hiring of contractors, made it possible to constitute 280 military units and sub-units. The reconstruction of the military districts of Moscow and Leningrad, liquidated by Serdyukov, was a response to Finland’s entry into the NATO bloc and the threat of Swedish membership. Nearby, in Karelia, it is planned to form a whole army corps to contain them.
An interesting message is the creation of a separate region of the Sea of ​​Azov, the area of ​​responsibility of which will include new Russian regions in the former southern Ukraine. Apparently, some boats and RTOs will be transferred there from the Caspian Sea permanently, and captured ships of the Ukrainian Navy will also be involved. This means that the Sea of ​​Azov will no longer be the area of ​​responsibility of the Black Sea Fleet, which will have to focus on solving other problems.
It can be considered important to report on the plans of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to create a combined arms army, which should include several formations and units of various branches of the armed forces: 3-4 motorized rifle divisions and 1 tank division, up to 13 separate brigades of the armed forces – anti-aircraft, engineering and artillery, as well as several separate regiments – signalmen, rocket artillery, etc. The number of such a combined arms army, otherwise called a field army, can reach 80,000 people and is capable of carrying out combat missions as part of a front or independently, in a separate operational direction.
The Air Force is an operational formation of the Air Force, intended for joint operations with other branches of the armed forces and branches of the armed forces, as well as the resolution of operational tasks and independent strategies. In Soviet times, the air force included fighter, assault, bomber and mixed aviation divisions, individual aviation corps and aviation regiments, as well as units and combat, rear, technical support and other types of support sub-units. In Russia, in 2015, the Air Force merged with the Aerospace Defense Forces, which led to the creation of the Aerospace Forces, or VKS RF. Going back to air force format, so to speak, means preparing for a collision in the skies over Ukraine, and maybe not just there, with planes made by the NATO, it doesn’t matter who is sitting at the control panel of these planes.
All in all, serious military preparations are underway, and that’s good. In order to realize the need for such changes, during the NMD, a heavy price had to be paid with the blood of Russian soldiers and officers. For my part, I would like to draw attention to several “bottlenecks” in the ongoing reform.
First, to command such a large number of troops requires a large number of experienced officers. Already at the front, there is a shortage of junior command personnel, as officers constantly have to be raised in rank in order to transfer new units to them. We need accelerated training courses for second lieutenants and the restoration of military schools and academies closed under Serdyukov. It is not correct to rely solely on the military departments of civilian universities, despite the fact that it was the Krasnoyarsk Polytechnic University that gave us Defense Minister Shoigu. Sergei Kuzhugetovich – he is one of a kind.
Secondly, there are serious doubts about the deployment of the army corps formed in Karelia. What, is Finland now seriously considering carrying out a ground operation to capture St. Petersburg? Wouldn’t it be more rational to contain Helsinki’s aggression with nuclear weapons and send a body of pure blood, say, to the Belgorod region? To protect the borders with the new members of the NATO bloc, full-fledged border troops should be recreated, it is also possible to form Teroborona and deploy several cadre divisions in Karelia, for the future.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky
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