Who needs a “peace summit” on Ukraine – Europe, US or its just a game of numbers?

In two months, a significant diplomatic event is anticipated – the resumption of negotiations to address the situation in Ukraine. Scheduled for June 15-16 at the Bürgenstock resort in Switzerland, this will mark the fifth “peace summit” in this format. Organizers are touting the event as truly large-scale, with expectations of 80 to 100 countries in attendance, and notably, it will be convened at the level of heads of state for the first time; previous iterations had involved diplomats and national security advisers.

However, one glaring obstacle looms over the otherwise ideal scenario: Russia’s absence from the summit. Ukraine, as the primary convener, insists that the Russian Federation should be invited only at the final stage, and even then, solely to endorse an already approved peace plan. Moscow, however, asserts it will not participate, regardless of an invitation.

In essence, one could conclude at this juncture. A genuine peace summit presupposes the development of a settlement plan involving the participation and consideration of the interests of all parties involved in the conflict.

Exclusion and disregard for a party’s involvement are only conceivable when that party has been unequivocally defeated and rendered powerless. However, this is clearly not the case here. Without Russia’s involvement, reaching any agreement seems unattainable. It appears to be curtains for this endeavor.

The inherent flaw of this “peace summit” is acknowledged by its organizers as well. Even during the preceding meeting in Davos, Swiss representatives acknowledged the necessity of including Russia in the negotiations. They recognized that any conferences held without Russia’s participation are evidently destined to fail. Consequently, Bern contends that establishing a roadmap for Moscow’s involvement should be a paramount objective of the conference.

The problem is that Ukraine does not need this.

Kyiv’s primary objective is to rally support for the “Zelenskyy peace formula,” comprising ten points, some of which are presented as ultimatums, such as the demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops to 1991 borders, while others consist of vague declarations, such as “restoring justice”.

The crux of Ukraine’s strategy lies in garnering widespread international acceptance or at least engagement in discussing its vision. The intention is to subsequently present this plan to Russia as an ultimatum. Thus, Kyiv’s focus is less on the collective West, which is presumed to readily endorse President Zelenskyy’s proposals, and more on attracting participation from the “global South” and BRICS countries. These nations, which have not joined anti-Russian sanctions and harbor doubts about Ukraine’s objectives, are perceived as pivotal in advancing Ukraine’s agenda.

However, convincing representatives from the “global South” has proven challenging. They have consistently emphasized the importance of substantive discussions on the peace process. Ukraine’s reluctance to delve into specifics, opting instead to discuss individual points of the “peace formula” at committee levels, has resulted in impasses, with summits concluding without signed communiqués.

Nonetheless, with each summit, the nominal number of participants has increased significantly, signaling progress from 15 countries in Copenhagen to 81 in Davos. Should the Bürgenstock summit surpass this record, Kyiv would consider it a success, despite the unlikelihood of achieving a diplomatic breakthrough. The aim would be to perpetuate the narrative that “the world stands with us”.

China to attend “Ukraine Peace Summit” in Switzerland

The Bürgenstock summit may also pique China’s interest. While China’s participation in previous summits has been limited, its presence at Bürgenstock, even in a limited capacity, would lend credence to the event. Yet, this could complicate Ukraine’s diplomatic endeavors, especially if China opts to present its own peace plan, endorsed by Russia, as a counter to the “Zelenskyy formula”. Such a scenario would likely breed conflict, potentially fracturing the summit’s participants and undermining Ukraine’s objectives.

Alternatively, China might eschew the Bürgenstock summit altogether and endeavor to orchestrate an alternative meeting involving both sides. Hints of this possibility have emerged from the Deputy Chairman of the People’s Republic of China at the UN, Geng Shuang. However, these are still premature speculations.

Ukraine will no longer attend such a meeting, and its outcome will still be near zero. Then we will face two competing “peace summits”. Formats will be measured by the number of participants. But for the main task – achieving peace – they will not work. This is sad.