A report by Foreign Affairs magazine shed light on Saudi nuclear ambitions, whether the Kingdom seeks to develop nuclear weapons to confront Iran, its regional rival, and how Washington can deal with this matter.
The report says that the ongoing negotiations to allow Saudi Arabia to develop a civilian nuclear program entail the risk of an arms race in the region, and indicates that moving forward with this file within the framework of a normalization agreement with Israel will require Washington to consider Riyadh’s desire to cooperate with it in the nuclear program and in its defense requests. It is “a development that could dramatically alter the regional security picture, particularly if Saudi Arabia could eventually want a [nuclear] weapons program, too”.
The currently proposed Saudi nuclear program includes civilian nuclear reactors managed under a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but Riyadh has previously expressed its discomfort with the presence of restrictions.
The magazine warns that peaceful nuclear programs are often the first step towards obtaining nuclear weapons.
Although Saudi Arabia does not yet have a large nuclear infrastructure of its own, it is building a small nuclear research reactor on the outskirts of Riyadh and building ballistic missiles with the help of China.
Last December, CNN revealed satellite images and US intelligence assessments that showed that “Saudi Arabia is now actively manufacturing its own ballistic missiles with the help of China” at a facility near Riyadh.
Foreign Affairs says that Riyadh may be committed to developing a civilian program at the present time, but given the threats of the Iranian nuclear bomb, it may be inclined towards military nuclear armament in the future, which makes it imperative that “Washington must work to restrict Saudi Arabia’s ability to develop its own nuclear weapons program”.
But Washington will face a dilemma, which is that too little cooperation with Riyadh means that it may lose Saudi support for normalization with Israel, and concede to adversaries such as China.
On the other hand, unconditional support for nuclear enrichment capabilities will give Riyadh the opportunity to develop a military program in the future, “and Washington must therefore accept Saudi Arabia’s peaceful nuclear ambitions but insist on strong measures and strict regulations to preempt Saudi proliferation.”
Last Wednesday, Democratic US Senator Edward Markey urged President Joe Biden to include strict guarantees to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in any nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia that may be concluded within the framework of a possible normalization of relations mediated by Washington between the Kingdom and Israel, according to Reuters.
The Biden administration has been holding talks with Saudi Arabia and Israel regarding a possible peace agreement since before the attack launched by Hamas on Israel on October 7, and talks are still continuing during the invasion and genocide in the Gaza Strip.
In September 2019, Saudi Arabia announced its intention to enrich uranium for its program to produce electricity from nuclear energy.
The issue of uranium enrichment was a sticking point between Riyadh and Washington, especially after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in 2018 that the Kingdom would develop nuclear weapons if Iran did so, according to Reuters.
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, says it wants to use nuclear energy to diversify its energy sources, but uranium enrichment also opens the door to the possibility of using it for military purposes.
“Saudi Arabia would join 31 other states, including Brazil, Egypt, Germany, and Japan”
The Foreign Affairs report warns that Riyadh may follow the example of other countries that have secretly developed a nuclear program for military purposes, such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, which it said, “clandestinely pursued nuclear weapons programs while pretending to adhere to safeguards”.
A civilian nuclear program could facilitate the development of a nuclear weapons program by giving Saudi Arabia dual-use technologies such as nuclear fuel rods, reprocessing facilities, and advanced reactor designs.
The reactors and uranium enrichment capabilities would provide the Saudi Kingdom with the infrastructure and knowledge base necessary to develop its nuclear capabilities by diverting materials or expertise toward military applications.
Riyadh can then use advanced enrichment techniques to produce weapons-grade Uranium and evade detection by international inspectors through concealment and deception.
Saudi Arabia can also separate the Uranium isotopes needed for highly enriched Uranium inside civilian facilities, making it difficult for inspectors to detect the existence of a military program.
It is also possible to convert the enriched Uranium needed to fuel nuclear reactors and further enrich it to levels suitable for a nuclear explosion.
Thus, according to the magazine, the Saudi civil nuclear program will give it a “latent” nuclear capability and the ability to deploy if it wishes to do so. Saudi Arabia thus joins 31 other countries, including Germany, Egypt, Brazil and Japan, that have maintained this position throughout history.
A bargaining chip
The report warns of the possibility of Riyadh using a civilian nuclear program as a bargaining chip or engaging in hostile behavior, as North Korea did, for example.
The Kingdom can enrich Uranium, increase its production of centrifuges, purchase nuclear materials and equipment from other countries, or mobilize internal political support to possess nuclear weapons, all in the hope of increasing its negotiating power.
The report indicates the possibility that Saudi Arabia would increase its nuclear capabilities if Iran escalated its capabilities to the point of manufacturing a nuclear bomb, and the Kingdom actually did not evade clarifying its nuclear intentions if Iran took this nuclear path. Mohammed bin Salman said that if Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear weapon The Kingdom will also do so.
Other countries
Iran’s nuclear progress may also prompt other countries in the region, such as the UAE or Turkey, to shift toward weaponization. The UAE has been criticized for its failure to disclose information about its civilian nuclear facilities.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had previously said that Turkey should not be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Riyadh, which sees itself as a regional leader, will not want either country, especially the UAE, which is its main competitor, to be able to surpass it in these nuclear ambitions, according to the magazine.
Although there are ongoing talks about establishing a formal defense relationship, the security arrangements between the United States and Saudi Arabia are not certain at all, especially if Donald Trump wins the presidency, according to the Foreign Affairs report.
The magazine notes that the former president refused to respond to the attack that targeted a Saudi oil facility in 2019 and did not do much to reassure Saudi officials that the second Trump administration if he returned to the White House, would support Riyadh.
The report also talks about establishing a security alliance that would allay fears of a nuclear Iran, or pressure Riyadh to sign the “123 Agreement” for nuclear cooperation included in the US Nuclear Energy Act, which prohibits Uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing, which are two methods of producing nuclear weapons. The UAE agreed to these guarantees when building its nuclear plant in 2021.
This agreement allows access to American civilian nuclear technology in exchange for an explicit commitment to refrain from arming, adherence to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, restrict enrichment levels, and return spent nuclear fuel to the United States to prevent the reprocessing of weapons materials.
However, one obstacle to such an agreement is Riyadh’s stated desire to enrich uranium domestically to generate electricity through controlled nuclear fission reactions, rather than relying on previously enriched uranium from external sources.
Suppose the United States is unable to negotiate a complete ban on enrichment and is unwilling to make other concessions. In that case, the Kingdom may turn to other countries, such as China, for assistance with nuclear technology, leading to a loss of transparency regarding nuclear activities and facilities, and losing… The United States for its influence.
Riyadh has long maintained friendly relations with Beijing, and these relations have strengthened over the past years.
In 2019, the two powers finalized a $10 billion agreement aimed at developing a refining and petrochemical complex.
Last month, Saudi Aramco stated that it was discussing with the Chinese Rongsheng Petrochemical Company the possibility of establishing a joint venture in the Saudi Aramco Jubail Refinery Company (SASREF).
Aramco acquired a 10 percent stake in Rongsheng in July 2023 through its subsidiary, Aramco Overseas, based in the Netherlands.
Rongsheng owns a 100 percent stake in Ningbo Zhongjin. It also has a stake in a joint venture to produce purified terephthalic acid.
Aramco’s move came in light of a Saudi-Chinese rapprochement in recent years, and while Riyadh seeks to attract foreign investments as part of its “vision” plan to diversify the economy.
Last month, officials supervising the city of NEOM, which Saudi Arabia is building, conducted a tour in China dedicated to attracting investors, during which they presented the broad outlines of the expensive project.
Beijing had helped the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in 2023.
In order to anticipate the Saudi shift towards China, the United States may need to make concessions, according to Foreign Affairs.
Washington could offer Riyadh to build a uranium enrichment facility in the Kingdom, which would give Riyadh greater control over its nuclear fuel supply chain and reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers.
The report says that the technological expertise and self-sufficiency that may result from the existence of a nuclear energy sector is consistent with the Kingdom’s ambitions to diversify its economy as the world reduces its dependence on oil.
The United States can still insist on strong measures to prevent the Kingdom from developing a military program. It can, for example, demand that any enrichment facility be run by American personnel.
“But Washington must be clear-eyed, as these measures will certainly reduce the risk of Saudi nuclear proliferation, but they will not eliminate it.”
The magazine stresses the importance of the United States working to restrict the Kingdom’s ability to develop its own nuclear weapons program from the beginning, and says that “it is certain that any agreement with Saudi Arabia will be subject to greater scrutiny.”
“Instead of enriching in Saudi Arabia, Washington could offer to guarantee a reliable supply of enriched uranium to the Kingdom’s reactors, ending its need for local enrichment facilities.
Enrichment facilities could be managed by American personnel instead of Saudis, with remote shutdown mechanisms established.
Washington could make the enrichment ban part of bilateral defense cooperation. This may take the form of a formal ban signed by Riyadh, or a non-binding supplementary document accompanying a formal agreement containing an additional clause in which the Kingdom agrees not to establish fuel cycle infrastructure.
This approach would allow Riyadh to retain the technical right to enrichment, provided that it agrees in advance not to do so.
The magazine also stresses the necessity of managing the Iranian nuclear program to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia and other regional countries and says that “Washington cannot get rid of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, and if the Kingdom fails to obtain the support it needs from Washington, it will resort to other countries to finance its nuclear program.”
