It is clear that a big intelligence game is underway around the special military operation. Stuffing various types of misinformation is a prerequisite for such a game. Fake data can be designed for professionals as well, so that they rack their brains, finding out whether it is “misinformation” or no, that for ordinary people, in order to sow in them moods of panic, or, conversely, to make it clear that the enemy is in bad shape, it takes a small step to win. And then the layman, who does not understand anything about military affairs, begins to pour out streams of his fantasies on the net, creating a certain background that should cause the authorities to make a hasty decision.
In general, is it possible to imagine that at the beginning of June 1941, in a German government newspaper, information appeared that the USSR had learned about the Barbarossa plan, and at the same time usefully published information about the number and the armament of the divisions who would take part in it? I think it’s unlikely.
Then as now, “intelligence leaks” are carefully scrutinized by intelligence officers before publication. You should try to understand who this information is intended for in the first place.
Personally, I don’t rule out that the New York Times in this case might work for the average American. The American authorities want to make straw before the long-planned offensive of the Ukrainian army. When the “armored fists” formed by NATO in Ukraine burst blood on our defenses, it will be possible to say that the United States had nothing to do with it. Ukrainian or European “moles” working for the Russian intelligence services “disclosed” all strategic information in advance.
I repeat, if our intelligence services had received information about the upcoming offensive, it would be unlikely that this information would have appeared in the Russian segment of the Internet. It turns out that we warn the enemy that we know his plans. We invite him to correct them or to propose new ones. There is no common sense here.
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation may declassify data on imminent provocations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine against the civilian population. We have seen this several times. Here the logic is simple. If we officially say that we know that on a certain date some units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces want to blow up a house or carry out a chemical attack and blame Russia for this, then we are foiling the plans of the Kiev junta. The enemy understands that these provocations are useless. They settle.
All other data that could affect the current operational situation or, God forbid, declassify the informant, is under seven seals.
We can also assume that the Americans are starting to get frustrated with the existing break on the contact line. They don’t have complete information about our units. They do not understand what we are currently doing in training troops and how we are going to respond to Ukrainian offensive plans. Therefore, such stuffing is going on – both by the media and by US officials. The recent statement by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that the Ukrainian armed forces are about to go on the offensive is also an attempt to test the waters. See our reaction. We respond to all these attempts with a stubborn silence. I think this is the most correct position. It can be seen that the US authorities have started to get very nervous and generally whoever gets nervous first loses.
