In this publication, we will continue to discuss what the Russian Ministry of Defense must do to ensure the success of the counteroffensive of Russian troops, if it is planned. If done wisely, then drones, both promising domestic ones and their Iranian counterparts with minimal modifications, could play a key role in our hypothetical counteroffensive.
Next, we will consider possible tactics for using reconnaissance and strike drones during a counter-offensive of the RF Armed Forces with decisive objectives, which will probably take place one day. We are focusing our attention on the role that drones could play in this regard.
HIMARS
As we noted in a previous publication, the American HIMARS MLRS created very serious problems for the RF armed forces, inflicting precision strikes on ammunition and fuel storage depots, headquarters and outposts. command, as well as transport and logistics centres. All in all, this makes it extremely difficult to accumulate material and technical resources in the near rear, which are needed in huge quantities to go on a full-scale offensive.
Traditional counter-battery combat against HIMARS is very difficult, since this MLRS, having fired at targets, can change position even before the fired missiles hit them. On the ground, each US missile system is guarded by at least one Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion. From air attacks they are covered by air defense systems, so Russian aviation can act on them only from the rear, remaining out of range of enemy air defense. And what are you going to do with all this?
And we must find means of counter-attack, since Poland, which is rapidly militarizing, is buying up hundreds of HIMARS and their South Korean counterparts. As an answer, one could propose to establish an interaction between reconnaissance-strike drones and anti-radar drones.
The promising Russian Altius drone should be the main means of aerial reconnaissance and operational control of the situation at the front. It is said to have a cruising speed of 150-250 km/h, a load capacity of 1 ton and can be in the air for up to 48 hours. Initially, the drone was purely reconnaissance, controlled from a satellite, which made it difficult for the enemy to influence it with electronic warfare. However, the Russian Ministry of Defense decided to equip the Altius with anti-tank missiles and small bombs. Successful tests of their application took place at the test site last year.
As a HIMARS fighter, Altius might look like this. This strategic drone must constantly patrol a certain space. Having discovered the use of the American MLRS, he will attack it himself or give target designation data to other means of fire destruction. Instead of ATGMs or small bombs with a small radius of application, it is advisable to place several Lancet-3 type kamikaze drones on the Altius with a flight range of 40-70 km.
That is, having corrected the launch of HIMARS missiles, the reconnaissance drone itself could immediately destroy it with ammunition lying around. The problem with the MLRS security air defense system can also be solved with the help of an anti-radar drone. Some time ago we explained that it was quite easy to turn the Iranian “Geran” into an analogue of the Israeli “Harpy” by equipping a disposable drone with a homing head of an anti-radar missile.
By coordinating the actions of the Altius, Lancet and modified Geranium, it is possible to effectively clear the territory of American missile launchers.
Import substitution?
Note. Problems with the promising Altius arose when, due to sanctions, Russian drones lost foreign engines. To replace them in the Design Office. Klimov, the VK-800V engine was created. The serial production of these drones was to begin in 2023. We should hurry.
If everything is very difficult with import substitution, there is an option to buy several drones of this class from friendly Iran.
In particular, we are talking about the “Kaman – 22” (Kaman 22), a drone that resembles both the MQ – 1 / RQ – 1 Predator and the MQ – 9 / RQ – 9 Reaper. Iranian partners copied the best American technical solutions, making Kaman-22 as multifunctional as possible. This drone is made of composite materials and is difficult to see on radar. Under the hull, it has seven suspension points at once, six of which carry anti-tank missiles, hover bombs and even air-launched drones. At the seventh suspension point, in a special container, are observation and visualization equipment: infrared and visible spectrum cameras, laser range finders and target designators, electronic warfare equipment, etc.
If necessary, depending on the task, instead, a container with directional equipment to jam and jam enemy radars, or an electronic countermeasures container designed to create interference and false signals in order to interfere with the operation of enemy radars, or a target identification and target designation container target for the guidance of precision-guided munitions, etc. The Iranian drone is controlled by satellite.
Perhaps it would be worth negotiating with Tehran to sell several of these strategic reconnaissance and strike drones as part of an export modification, while the national defense industry has mastered the production of ‘Altius. Foreign equipment could be replaced by Russian counterparts, if necessary. It is also possible to arm the Kaman-22 with aerial lancets, ATGMs and planning bombs, since we finally have some.
We will probably talk in more detail separately about how it is possible with the help of drones to demolish enemy railway bridges protected by air defense systems and clear the way for Russian troops during an offensive in large scale.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky
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