RIYADH – Saudi Arabia’s onshore oil reserves reached record highs by early August, not because the kingdom pumped less, but because it could not move what it pumped out of the country fast enough to match the pace of production.
The International Energy Agency said on Wednesday that Saudi production rose by 900,000 barrels per day in July to 8.2 million barrels per day, a significant increase that would ordinarily move swiftly through export terminals and onto tankers headed for Europe and Asia. Instead, a substantial portion of those additional volumes shifted into onshore storage facilities, accumulating at unprecedented levels as transit disruptions sealed off the routes that normally handle Saudi crude.
“East coast tanker loadings dropped sharply in the second half of July while Red Sea loadings became sporadic due to renewed transit risks through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, respectively,” the IEA said in its monthly oil market report. “As a result, onshore Saudi crude inventories jumped to record highs by early August.”
The arithmetic behind the stockpile is visible in Kpler data cited by the IEA. Saudi oil shipments in July held broadly stable at 4.5 million barrels per day, and east coast shipments rose by 420,000 barrels per day compared to the previous month, responding to higher production. Attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz then halted that growth before it could be sustained. By the end of July, loadings from the Red Sea port of Yanbu had also fallen sharply after Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement intensified strikes on oil tankers and oil infrastructure in the region.
The combined effect: Saudi onshore oil reserves rose by 11.8 million barrels in July to 89.7 million barrels, a level the IEA described as a record.

For Riyadh, the accumulation is a logistical problem with direct financial consequences. Oil held in onshore storage is not generating revenue, and the kingdom has structured its fiscal planning around production targets that assume exports keep pace with output. A widening gap between what Saudi Aramco produces and what actually reaches paying customers is a direct strain on the government’s budget position, at a moment when oil prices face countervailing pressure from demand softness out of China and from OPEC supply decisions working in the opposite direction.
The Strait of Hormuz has become the central constraint. As negotiations over Iran’s conditions for reopening the strait remain at an impasse, the volume of crude that cannot reach its buyers continues to grow. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the southern Red Sea chokepoint that Ansar Allah has been targeting as part of its campaign in solidarity with Gaza, offers an alternative route, but attacks on tankers there have made it sporadically impassable as well.
Saudi Arabia has few short-term options. The kingdom cannot change the geography of its export routes, and it cannot compel safe transit through corridors controlled by actors whose motivations have nothing to do with Saudi commercial interests. Increasing onshore storage is an operational response, not a solution. The record levels by early August indicate that the gap between what the kingdom can produce and what it can export is not narrowing.
The US Navy’s enforcement actions in the Gulf of Oman against vessels suspected of defying its Iran blockade have introduced a separate layer of risk for commercial shipping in the region, compounding the disruption that Houthi strikes in the Red Sea have already imposed. Commercial operators are pricing that uncertainty into transit decisions, with some avoiding the region entirely in favor of longer routes that reduce physical exposure to the conflict zone at the cost of added time and fuel.
What the IEA’s data does not address is when any of this changes. The agency’s monthly report gives a precise accounting of what happened in July but offers no timeline for when the Strait of Hormuz reopens, when Ansar Allah’s Red Sea campaign ends, or when Saudi export capacity returns to something that matches the kingdom’s production ambitions. The record-high onshore stockpile is a number that describes the problem accurately. Its resolution requires political and military developments that the IEA, by its nature, cannot forecast.
The IEA report comes alongside the agency’s revised forecast for the global oil market, now projecting a deficit of 1.8 million barrels per day in the third quarter of 2026, more than double last month’s estimate. Saudi Arabia’s record onshore reserves are one expression of that tightening: crude is being produced but not reaching buyers, and the mismatch between supply and accessible output is a physical reality playing out in storage tanks across the kingdom’s Eastern Province.

