TEHRAN – Iran is not waiting for the Doha talks to conclude before writing its control of the Strait of Hormuz into law. The parliament’s National Security Commission approved the toll bill this spring. A full Majlis vote, a Guardian Council review, and a presidential signature remain. Iran has set mid-August as the target for formally beginning what it calls “service fee” assessments on transiting vessels. The Islamabad MoU expires on August 21.
The diplomatic and legislative tracks are converging at the same point on the calendar, and Iran is running both simultaneously.
The legislation that cleared the National Security Commission would require all vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to pay fees denominated in Iranian rial. Ships linked to the United States and Israel are barred from passage entirely under its terms. Vessels from countries that have imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran are also prohibited. Commission member Mojtaba Zarei confirmed the exclusion provisions when the committee vote was reported by Anadolu Agency. The bill still awaits a full Majlis vote before proceeding to the Guardian Council and the presidential desk.
Iran has been careful with the language. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in June that “there was no talk of charging tolls, but that a fee for services was expected.” That distinction – toll versus service fee – is the semantic frame Iran is using to maintain compliance with the MoU while preserving the payment mechanism. The practical effect is the same. The IRGC has been charging $1.5 to $2 million per vessel since mid-March, routing compliant ships through a northern corridor anchored at Qeshm and Larak, accepting yuan, cash, and barter. The Majlis bill would convert that operational reality into enforceable statute backed by law, with a rial-denominated fee schedule that no subsequent government could reverse by executive decision alone.
The timing is not incidental. The MoU signed in Islamabad on June 17 runs for 60 days, expiring August 21. Iran’s stated target for formal service-fee assessment is mid-August. If the legislative calendar holds, Iran will either have enacted the law or be in final stages of ratification at the exact moment Washington must decide whether to reimpose sanctions or extend the diplomatic framework.
The diplomatic calendar has also been compressed by protocol. The next round of Doha talks will not begin until after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s burial on July 9. That is seven days in which Iran’s parliament keeps working while the diplomatic track pauses for mourning. Business Standard reported that negotiators from both sides spent two days in Doha addressing Hormuz transit and frozen funds, but neither side confirmed whether any differences had been bridged. With the MoU window at 45 days when Doha concluded, the effective negotiating window is now 38 days and falling.
The Doha round left the Hormuz file unresolved. Iran confirmed during the talks that it is determined to win international recognition of its control over the strait – language that frames the service fee not as a temporary war measure to be negotiated away but as a permanent feature of Iranian maritime sovereignty that any deal must accommodate. The distinction matters because it shapes what Iran is willing to exchange. If the fee system is a bargaining chip, it can be traded. If it is a sovereignty claim backed by domestic statute, it cannot be.
The legislation’s exclusion of US-linked vessels creates a structural problem for any Hormuz framework Washington would accept. The MoU’s transit provisions describe commercial shipping operating freely through the strait. Iran’s bill as approved by committee describes a carve-out that specifically bars American-associated vessels – a provision that cannot coexist with a Hormuz arrangement the United States would endorse. That contradiction has not appeared in any Doha readout. It has not been resolved, and it has not been placed on the formal agenda in terms specific enough to force a decision.
Vance, speaking after the Doha round concluded, said the United States is concerned about the nuclear issue and that nuclear discussions would start soon. Nuclear talks have not begun. The Hormuz fee question has not been resolved. The frozen assets discussion produced partial movement, with Iran confirming the funds would be used for its own procurement needs rather than exclusively for US goods as Trump had announced. Three of the MoU’s most consequential open questions – nuclear access, Hormuz recognition, and the asset formula – remain unaddressed.
Iran’s parliament is not operating on the MoU’s timeline. It set the mid-August target independently of what Doha produces. The Oman-anchored corridor is already operational, generating transit data Iran will cite as evidence of functional Hormuz administration when the final agreement is negotiated. The fee system, the corridor, the oil export surge, and the legislation moving through Majlis are parallel tracks, all running toward August 21 – some requiring a deal to stop them, and some not.
The next Doha round – still undated, contingent on a burial not concluded until July 9 – will have to determine whether the Hormuz fee legislation is on the table for modification as part of a deal, or whether Iran’s Majlis has already placed it outside the frame of what diplomacy can touch. By the time that round convenes, Iran may be approaching the Guardian Council stage. The window is 38 days. The bill does not need the MoU to succeed before it becomes law.
