DOHA — On Wednesday afternoon, as US and Iranian negotiators wrapped up two days of indirect talks in Qatar, President Trump told reporters that Iran had agreed to “just about everything we need” and that “the denuclearization of Iran is moving along well.” Hours later, his vice president described a different conversation. “Obviously, we’re worried about the nuclear issue,” JD Vance told reporters. “We’re going to start talking about that.”
The two statements do not describe the same negotiation. Three weeks into the 60-day window established by the June 17 memorandum of understanding, US and Iranian technical teams in Doha spent their time on the Strait of Hormuz shipping regime and the release of $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets. Iran’s enrichment program, the issue that any lasting agreement must resolve, was not substantively addressed, according to Eric Lob of the Carnegie Middle East Program. The nuclear issue “does not appear to have been tackled in an in-depth manner, if at all,” Lob said.
Talks are now paused. The next round will not take place until after the burial of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Mashhad on July 9, when Shia mourning ceremonies that began Thursday in Tehran will conclude. When negotiators reconvene, 39 days of the 60-day window will remain.
The Doha sessions produced specific deliverables on the issues that were on the agenda. Iran’s delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, agreed to establish a communications channel with Washington to report violations of the MoU. Part of the $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets held in Qatar was agreed for release to purchase goods Iran requires. Qatar and Pakistan mediators described the overall talks as producing “positive progress.” What the Doha talks did not produce is a framework for what the nuclear portion of any agreement would require from either side.
On Iran’s side, that question involves several layers that have not been publicly addressed. Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated this week that IAEA inspectors currently have access to only two locations: the Bushehr power plant and Natanz. Dozens of other declared and undeclared facilities remain outside inspection access. The enrichment level, centrifuge count, and disposition of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, calculated by multiple Western governments to be sufficient for approximately ten nuclear devices, have not been part of any disclosed negotiating text.
What is happening at those other facilities during the pause is not publicly known. Spencer Faragasso of the Institute for Science and International Security told CBS News this week that satellite imagery showed continued work at Pickaxe Mountain. “We have observed continued construction at Pickaxe Mountain, which indicates that Iran is progressing with its plans,” Faragasso said. Pickaxe Mountain is a hardened underground site in the Zagros range approximately one mile south of the Natanz complex. Tunneling there began in 2020. International inspectors have never been granted access. Western intelligence assessments place the facility roughly 2,000 feet deeper in granite than the Fordow enrichment plant, potentially beyond the reach of aerial munitions.
The US position on enrichment has not been publicly clarified in the context of these talks. Trump’s statement that Iran had agreed to “just about everything” suggests the administration may be framing the Hormuz and asset agreements as early evidence of Iranian flexibility on the broader deal. Analysts who followed the Doha talks do not share that reading. The parties were “prioritizing the Strait of Hormuz and delaying discussing the complex and contentious nuclear program,” Lob told CBS News, describing a pattern of managing the accessible issues while the harder question waits.
Iran’s own public position on enrichment has hardened since February. Ghalibaf and senior IRGC-aligned officials have described the enrichment program as non-negotiable in its existence, even if its scope could be subject to parameters. What those parameters might be, and whether they align with what the United States would need to call the result denuclearization, has not been tested in any round of talks to date. The gap between Trump calling it “moving along well” and Vance saying they are “going to start talking about” it is not a communications failure. It is a description of where the negotiation actually is.
Mojtaba Khamenei has still not publicly stated whether the anti-nuclear fatwa his father issued in 2003 remains binding under his authority, leaving Iran’s nuclear doctrine technically uncodified at the moment nuclear talks are scheduled to begin. His political base in the IRGC has historically favored weapons capability. The new supreme leader’s silence on the question that most directly determines whether a deal is achievable is the condition under which Vance’s “going to start talking about that” will take place.
The 60-day window does not extend automatically. The June 17 memorandum of understanding established the negotiating clock without specifying what happens if the window closes without a nuclear framework. Thirty-nine days is enough time to agree on parameters. Whether it is enough to agree on inspections, enrichment limits, stockpile disposition, and verification mechanisms for a program that has not been comprehensively inspected in four years is a question the Doha talks did not answer and will not be answered until negotiators reconvene after the burial in Mashhad.
